Skip to main content
TradeCompliance.io

Main navigation

  • Home
  • 101s
    • Proliferation Finance
    • Export Controls
    • Trade Compliance in Universities and Research Institutes
  • Industry Guidance
    • Introduction
    • Strategic Competition
    • Acquisition Methods
    • Sectoral Analysis
    • Case Studies
    • Red Flags
    • Compliance and Due Diligence
    • Conclusions
  • About

Breadcrumb

  1. Home

Red Flags

  • < prev
  • Guidance Introduction
  • next >

This section draws together the due diligence elements identified from the analysis on this sectoral guidance.

Red Flag Handout
Click to download these red flags a a printable flyer. 

 

Category

Red Flag

Source

Company/Partner

  • Company is linked to the military or on a watch list​
  • Company operates in a strategic sector​
  • Company's website identifies problematic activity such as links to military end-uses and/or military end-users of concern​
  • Company is less than 5 years old​
  • Company has previous negative publicity for proliferation concerns​
  • Company is an authorized arms manufacturer or is listed as a strategic enterprise​
  • Company’s website has a communist party page demonstrating its close links to the Chinese state.

Company website, LinkedIn, news media coverage, sanctioned entity lists (in particular, the China country section of the U.S> BIS Entity List, and the U.S. DoD’s “Chinese Military Companies List” per Section 1260H of the NDAA of 2021; and the U.S. Treasury Dept. OFAC’s “Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Company List (NS-CMIC List)).

Academic Involvement

  • Entity is a university in a country of concern (or identified explicitly on a sanctions/restricted party list or on the ASPI University tracker
  • Entity has an academic program or laboratory in a strategic field and receives government sponsorship
  • Entity has a known linkage to national laboratory researchers in a strategic field
University website; U.S. BIS Entity List; Japan Foreign End-User List, (maybe EU / UK)
ASPI Tracker
  • Nature of Technology
  • Is the technology on a control list?​
  • Is the technology a chokepoint technology?​
  • Is the technology sought by a country of concern through a nationalized indigenization plan?
  • Was a military-grade product sought for civilian purposes when a civilian-grade option is available?
  • Does the technology feature in the sectoral analysis section of this guidance?

Technology control lists, product order

Shipping

  • Destination in a country of concern, including great powers for strategic technology​
  • Vague delivery dates​
  • Odd destinations​ and/or unusual routing

Product order

Illicit Involvement

  • Is there a lack of information on end use​? Is the procurer an intermediary rather than an end user? Are they hesitant to provide information on the actual end user?
  • Lack of company website or other official presence
  • Cash payments for expensive orders that usually are financed​
  • Incomplete orders, shipments for specific parts​

See also the distributors section below

Geography and Third Country Diversion

  • Is a party to the transaction in a country of concern or contested territory like in Ukraine?​
  • Is the party based in Hong Kong (mostly relevant for China) or in a CIS country (mostly relevant for Russia?
  • Is the destination in a location that is a hub for controlled activity?​
  • Does the end destination make sense for the product being purchased?​
  • Is the end destination a freight forwarding firm or other transshipment hub?​
  • Is the shipping route abnormal?​
  • Does the product make sense for the customer?​
  • Is the packaging consistent for the product and destination?​
  • Can the country support the industry the technology is viable for?​

 

China Specific Red Flags

  • Company has a known link to the Thousand Talents Plan or similar recruitment agencies.
  • Company is in a strategic industry and located in a domestic geographical hub near other entities in that industry.
  • Is the end user one of the authorized military goods manufacturers or is it a strategic entity such as CASC, China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, or the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics?

 

Transaction

  • Routine maintenance or services declined by customer​.

 

Russia Specific Red Flags
  • Is the company a wholesaler? Wholesalers are often used as intermediaries by Russian companies engaged in emerging technology development to access parts and components. 
  • Does your business partner in your country own a company inside of Russia? This is a common technique in more sophisticated procurement attempts. 
  • Is the company attempting to buy electronics, machine tools or other goods that can be used in armaments production? 
  • Is the company asking you to pay via cryptocurrency or to a bank account in a third country? 
  •  Does the company have a website? Does the website advertise that they can help their customers avoid trade restrictions?  
 
  • < prev
  • Guidance Introduction
  • next >

Download as a PDF

Sectoral Guidance

Sectoral Guidance

  • Sectoral Guidance
  • Introduction
  • Strategic Competition
  • Implications at the National Level
  • Trends in Technology Acquisition
  • Sectoral Analysis
  • Red Flags
  • Compliance and Due Diligence
  • Potential Additions to ICP
  • Use of Distributors
  • Conclusions
  • Annex 1: Case Studies
  • Annex 2: Further Resources and Guidance
  • Annex 3: Due Diligence Tools and Techniques
  • Sectoral Guidance PDF

Site Maintained By The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Washington DC Office) Suite 1225, 1400K Street, Washington DC, 20005, USA. Email [email protected]

User account menu

  • Log in