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7 - Former Employee Falsified Reports to Transship Goods to Iran and China

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Cheng Bo, a.k.a. Joe Cheng, a US-based former employee of Avnet Asia Pte. Ltd., a Singapore-based company specializing in electronic components and software, allegedly falsified documents in order to ship export-controlled power amplifiers to the PRC, and previously Iran.

Cheng was a sales account manager who represented Avnet’s interest with a Hong Kong-based customer which Cheng was affiliated with. Cheng then fabricated documents in order to export power amplifiers of US origin to Hong Kong, knowing they would be transshipped from Hong Kong to the PRC. From 2012-2015 Cheng was involved in 18 separate shipments that were transshipped in the same way. The shipments totaled almost one million dollars' worth of equipment.

A separate, unnamed sales manager for Avnet, based in Singapore, operated similarly and shipped goods to Iran and China over 29 unique shipments valuing at least $347,000.

While the criminal investigation is still under way, Avnet Asia has admitted liability for its employee’s conduct and has agreed to pay over 3 million dollars in settlement.

Footnotes

[1] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-charged-criminal-conspiracy-export-us-power-amplifiers-china

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Download as a PDF

Sectoral Guidance

Sectoral Guidance

  • Sectoral Guidance
  • Introduction
  • Strategic Competition
  • Implications at the National Level
  • Trends in Technology Acquisition
  • Sectoral Analysis
  • Red Flags
  • Compliance and Due Diligence
  • Potential Additions to ICP
  • Use of Distributors
  • Conclusions
  • Annex 1: Case Studies
  • Annex 2: Further Resources and Guidance
  • Annex 3: Due Diligence Tools and Techniques
  • Sectoral Guidance PDF

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