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10 - Raytheon Employee Illegally Exported Missile Guidance Technology and Data to China

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Wei Sun had been an employee of Raytheon Missile and Defense for 10 years before attempting to illegally transport proprietary technical information out of the country and into China. In 2018, ahead of international travel Sun had requested to take a company laptop on his travels. Raytheon denied the request. Raytheon officials say the request was denied because Sun was working on an ITAR controlled project.[1] Despite being instructed not to bring his company laptop, the next month in January of 2019, Sun accessed his laptop from outside of the US and emailed a letter of resignation.

Sun eventually returned to the US where he was questioned. The investigation found that Sun had visited China, Cambodia, and Hong Kong, though he had initially reported he had been to Singapore and the Philippines. Ultimately, he was sentenced to 38 months in prison for delivering sensitive missile technology to China in violation of the AECA and ITAR for being exported without a license.

Footnotes

[1] https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/casestudies/case-study-sun.pdf

[1] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-raytheon-engineer-sentenced-exporting-sensitive-military-related-technology-china

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Sectoral Guidance

Sectoral Guidance

  • Sectoral Guidance
  • Introduction
  • Strategic Competition
  • Implications at the National Level
  • Trends in Technology Acquisition
  • Sectoral Analysis
  • Red Flags
  • Compliance and Due Diligence
  • Potential Additions to ICP
  • Use of Distributors
  • Conclusions
  • Annex 1: Case Studies
  • Annex 2: Further Resources and Guidance
  • Annex 3: Due Diligence Tools and Techniques
  • Sectoral Guidance PDF

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