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16 - Dual-Use Quantum Telecommunications Network

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In 2021 a team at University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) launched a “quantum link” network. The network was developed using technology and equipment from foreign universities and countries. Through this university collaboration, the PRC has developed an ‘unhackable’ communication network connecting Beijing to Shanghai. To accomplish this, the network uses “over 700 optical fibers on the ground and two ground-to-satellite links.”

While the primary goal is to create a link between Beijing and Shanghai, this link accomplishes more than that by linking in other major cities and strategic technology hubs, such as Hefei, Wuxi, and Jinan. If truly ‘unhackable’ as advertised, the system could easily contribute to the PRC’s strategic and military communication systems, well beyond the business-to-business communication between banks that it is currently advertised to support. 

This question of unhackability relies on the successful integration of quantum cryptography methods to this system. The satellite utilized for this endeavor is the Miscius satellite developed in 2016 by the same lead professor at USTC that led this project.[1] Originally the satellite itself was the vulnerability in the system. The system uses entangled photons to create secret keys used to decrypt the message on the receiving end. Originally, the satellite was a relay point for the message, meaning it would decrypt the message to encrypt it again to retransmit it. To secure the Quantum Link, the satellite itself is no longer needed to decrypt the messages, instead it will simultaneously transmit the keys to two separate ground stations which would be able to detect an error if any interference had occurred.[2] 

The lead researcher even went so far as to say that “we don’t need to trust the satellite, so the satellite can be made by anyone- even by your enemy.”[3] While ominous, this does highlight some of the MCF utility of the satellite which was developed in a partnership with the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information (IQOQI), Vienna, of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the satellite does have ground stations located in Europe which were developed by IQOQI.[4] This case exemplifies how university collaboration can be used to advance strategic communications with potential dual-use implications.

Footnotes

[1] https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/china-reaches-new-milestone-in-space-based-quantum-communications/

[2] https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2401-y

[3] https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/china-reaches-new-milestone-in-space-based-quantum-communications/ 

[4] https://www.aerospace-technology.com/projects/micius-quantum-communication-satellite/

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Sectoral Guidance

Sectoral Guidance

  • Sectoral Guidance
  • Introduction
  • Strategic Competition
  • Implications at the National Level
  • Trends in Technology Acquisition
  • Sectoral Analysis
  • Red Flags
  • Compliance and Due Diligence
  • Potential Additions to ICP
  • Use of Distributors
  • Conclusions
  • Annex 1: Case Studies
  • Annex 2: Further Resources and Guidance
  • Annex 3: Due Diligence Tools and Techniques
  • Sectoral Guidance PDF

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