Biotechnology

Biology is an old science that has been around for a majority of civilized history. Despite the length of time spend in studying this science, major discoveries are made only within a little more than the past century. More recently, biotechnology have emerged to leverage this old science for many beneficial applications. From enhancing healthcare to increasing food security, biotech products have a significant impact on modern life. However, the risk of a bioweapon made possible by this emerging biotech also looms in the background. The biotech domain is undergoing substantial evolution at present, but emerging technology presents potential new threats, which will carry many implications for export controls. Additionally, these new biotechnologies are the result of integrating biology and other sciences, which introduces a variety of vulnerabilities. Cyber and sensitive information security are among the top concerns. CNS work to map out the biotech industries in countries of interest and gauge their risks and potential impacts on the international community. CNS have also reported on a supply chain network for Russian chemical weapon. While most traded chemicals have legitimate industrial uses, some are vital for chemical weapon production and can be diverted for this purpose. Additionally, chemical reagents are an important component to a majority of biotechnologies, thus warranting a collective analysis of both industries.

China’s chemical and biological contract development and manufacturing organization (CDMO) sector is an area of potential concern in its biotech industry. CDMO allows many researchers and biotech companies with limited resources and expertise access to these so that they may advance their objectives. Because of this accessibility, CDMO have the potential to lower barriers for chemical and biological development, thus providing actors that lack the resource and expertise to development these weapons of mass destruction an entry point.[1] A concern more prominent than non-state actors gaining access to developing chemical and biological weapons is that the Chinese government will have access to these CDMO for weapons development. Thanks to their Civil-Military Fusion policy, the PRC have access to the same barrier-lowering resources and expertise as well as any data resulting from partnerships with foreign entities. These datasets can be crucial for not only weapons development but also biotechnology advancement. The PRC have already leveraged their biotech industry to gather these data for questionable goals. They have collected genomic data from their Muslim minority, the Uyghurs, to development surveillance technologies tailored toward the population,[2] and from prenatal tests popular globally.[3] The same company collecting this genomic data, Beijing Genomic Institution (BGI) Group, have also been aggressively marketing their products to the West, including several states in the US, to use their genetic collection products as a countermeasure to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Other than China’s CDMO service industry, its pharmaceutical industry also has a prominent presence in the global biotech market. Aside from medical products, China is one of the world’s largest exporters of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) and its API imports pale in comparison. While the biggest importers of China’s APIs are geographically close to the country, such as Japan, India, and Vietnam, its global presence reaches almost all the other continents. Major countries on continents other than Asia include the United States, Brazil, Nigeria, and Germany. With the CDMO service industry and China’s strong global presence as a major source of APIs, China has made itself one of the top destinations for global biotech development and research.

The biotechnology sector in Russia revolved around their agricultural biotech industry to ensure food security for its populace. While the country’s biotech industry development was stagnant in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a few in Russia’s leadership recognized the sector’s importance for national prestige and growth since the beginning of the 21st century.[4] Food security, a historically significant issue, was the main priority for development within the biotech industry. This led Russia to become one of the world’s largest providers of wheat[5] and other agricultural products, even though their agricultural biotech sector relied on imported goods.[6] Many of these imported goods are to support the agricultural industries and include items such as livestock feed and seeds, totaling $16.3 billion from 2011 to 2020. Paraguay and Brazil are the top two countries that Russia imports its agricultural products from, totaling to $2.85 billion and $2.65 billion respectively. Germany ($1.42bn), Netherlands ($1.33bn), and China ($1.20bn) are the next largest source of agriculture produces for Russia. In comparison, Russia was able to export $21.5 billion worth of agricultural products, with its largest buyers being Turkey and China, at $6.6 billion and $2.5 billion respectively. China is a significant agricultural partner for Russia, in terms of imports and exports.[7]

Russia’s pharmaceutical industry is another major sector for its biotech industry.[8] However, Russia does not manufacture enough pharmaceutical products to support its population, so the majority of the product is imported from other countries,[9] similarly to its agricultural sector. This reliance on imports extends to the raw materials used to manufacture pharmaceutical products, including active pharmaceutical ingredients, of which China is a major provider. The global sanctions against Russia resulting from its invasion of Ukraine disrupt imports that allowed Russia’s biotech industry to thrive. The global food market has already been impacted by the withdrawals of Russia’s agricultural resources[10] and Russia is unable to maintain its medical supplies.[11]

Russia’s chemical industry have long been suspected to be involved with the country’s chemical weapon program. Several entities that were believed to support this program, have be placed on a U.S. Department of Commerce watchlist in early 2021.[12] A noteworthy aspect of this list is that it contains companies based in Germany and Switzerland, which extends the network into the global supply chain.[13] Companies trading dual-use chemical precursors and technology should practice due diligence to avoid being an unwitting accomplice to chemical weapons proliferation.

Takeaways

In both Russia and China, there is potential for the biotechnology and chemical sector to be misused to develop unconventional weapons. In the case of Russia, this concern chiefly focuses on the potential misuse of supplied equipment and chemicals, especially considering the existing infrastructure left behind by their covert bioweapons program. Dual-use chemicals being diverted from legitimate industry use to weapons programs is another concern that warrants attention. In the case of China, concerns are related to the potential for misuse of genomic information. Companies trading dual-use technology and resources should undertake enhanced due diligence, especially when dealing with either country. Companies holding genomic information should also implement bio cybersecurity best practices to safeguard digitized genomic information. Additionally, China’s CDMO’s attractive position to reduce the cost for research makes them a prime source for data generation. Researchers of dual-use concern topics should avoid using CDMOs for data collection so that the research cannot be leveraged for weapon development. Non dual-use topic researchers should also be vigilant with data agreements when working with CDMOs to limit opportunities for theft of research data.